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SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT: WHY
IT MAY BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO MODERATE
THEIR SOCIAL MEDIA
Alex Hadjian*
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout 2017, seven Twitter users who posted criticism of
President Donald J. Trump in comment threads begun by the
President’s Twitter account “@realDonaldTrump” discovered that
they were blocked from viewing, replying to, or otherwise interacting
with @realDonaldTrump.1 In Knight First Amendment Institute v.
Trump, these users brought suit against the President, alleging that
President Trump and members of his staff violated the First
Amendment by acting within their capacity as government officials to
block the seven users in retaliation for their speech.2 The plaintiffs
now attempt to establish two key points throughout their complaint:
(1) President Trump’s use of the Twitter account was in his “official
capacity rather than his personal one,” and therefore (2) Defendants
engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint-based exclusion by blocking
users from viewing or replying to @realDonaldTrump.3
This developing case against President Trump raises the same
question recently decided by a district court in Virginia: “[W]hen is a
social media account maintained by a public official considered
* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., History, University of
California, Los Angeles. I wish to thank Professor Aaron Caplan for his guidance, encouragement,
patience, and witty constructive criticism. Special thanks to Professor Marcy Strauss as well in
providing the initial inspiration for this article by drawing my attention to the Davison case. I would
also like to thank my friend, Jessica Hicks, as well as the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review, for their helpful suggestions and valuable feedback. Most importantly, I would like to thank
my mother, Nirva, and my father, Ara, for their continued love and support.
1. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 16–23, Knight First Amendment
Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 17-cv-05205)
[hereinafter Complaint].
2. See id. at 1–3.
3. See id. at 3, 13.
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‘governmental’ in nature, and thus subject to constitutional
constraints?”4 In Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors,5
the court reasoned that: (1) Defendant, an elected public official,
utilized a social media platform as a “tool of governance”6 and
therefore (2) Defendant’s blocking of a private citizen for an offensive
comment on social media violated the First Amendment.7
If theoretically extended and applied to cases such as President
Trump’s, Davison would have courts examine certain factors under a
totality of the circumstances test when determining if government
officials have sufficiently acted in an “official capacity” through social
media.8 If nothing else, the methodology and factors the court
considered to reach its verdict make Davison an instructive blueprint
for future jurisprudence where government officials’ use of social
media platforms is concerned. Defining the limits of how government
officials can utilize social media is important because social media
allows officials to reach a public whose lives are increasingly spent
online.9 Such elaboration not only facilitates efficient dissemination
of the official’s particular policy agendas, but allows private citizens
to engage with officials directly on such matters of public import.10
Part II of this Comment lays out the pertinent facts of Davison.
Part III explains the reasoning of the court in its ultimate holding. Part
IV examines the Supreme Court and appellate jurisprudence in this
area of law and concludes that the court’s reasoning in Davison
comports with that jurisprudence. Part IV also argues that the decision
provides a practical and desirable methodology for future courts. Part
IV concludes by applying Davison to the facts of the case against
President Trump to illustrate the above points. Part V closes with the
assertion that Davison is an instructive and even viable model for
future cases in this area.

4. Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 711 (E.D. Va. 2017),
aff’d sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019).
5. 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017).
6. Id. at 713.
7. Id. at 718.
8. See id. at 711–12.
9. See Shannon Greenwood et al., Social Media Update 2016, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 11,
2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-update-2016.
10. Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 2003–10 (2011).
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Davison case arose in the context of Facebook,11 a social
media platform used by “[r]oughly eight-in-ten online Americans.”12
Plaintiff Brian C. Davison’s allegation stems from an incident where
Defendant Loudoun County Board of Supervisors’ Chair, Phyllis J.
Randall, banned him from her Facebook page for a single night
following an offensive comment by Davison.13
The comment was made on a Facebook page titled “Chair Phyllis
J. Randall,” which had been created and operated by Randall, in
collaboration with her chief of staff, since the day before Randall was
sworn into office.14 Randall’s avowed purpose in creating this page
outside of the County’s official channels was to address and converse
with Loudoun County residents without being constrained by the
County’s official social media policies.15 This circumvention meant
that Randall, rather than the County, would retain control over the
page even after she left office.16
Nevertheless, Randall categorized the page as “Government
Official” in the “About” section of “Chair Phyllis J. Randall” and
many of her posts “relate[d] to her work as Chair of the Loudoun
County Board of Supervisors.”17 In fact, some posts even stated that
they were submitted “[o]n behalf of the Loudoun County Board of
Supervisors.”18 Such posts were occasionally offset by more
“personal” posts on the page, including documentation of an afternoon
shopping trip and a declaration of affection for the German language.19
Some of the work-related posts Randall made promoted
initiatives she created in her official capacity, documented meetings
of the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, or encouraged
attendance at events related to Randall’s work as Chair.20 One post
concerned a joint town hall discussion held by the Loudoun County
Board of Supervisors and the Loudoun County School Board.21 Soon
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 706.
Greenwood et al., supra note 9.
Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 706, 710–11.
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 709 (alteration in original).
Id. at 710.
Id. at 708–09.
Id. at 710.
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thereafter, a Loudoun County resident by the name of Brian Davison
commented on this posting and set the lawsuit into motion.22 Neither
party supplied the exact wording of Davison’s comment, but it
apparently alleged “corruption on the part of Loudoun County’s
School Board involving conflicts of interests among the School Board
and their family members.”23 Taking offense to the allegations against
her colleagues on the school board, Randall deleted her post (including
Davison’s reply) and subsequently banned Davison from her page.24
The ban lasted no more than twelve hours and only prevented
commenting on or private messaging to Randall’s page; it did not
prevent reading that page or sharing content from that page on other
pages.25 Even so, Davison (representing himself) filed a lawsuit
alleging that Randall had acted under color of state law to deprive him
of his constitutional right to freedom of speech.26 The court ultimately
sided with Davison, finding that Randall’s actions against Davison
violated his right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment.27
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The Davison court’s result rested on two key findings: (1) Randall
acted under color of state law in operating the Facebook page, and (2)
blocking Davison because of the viewpoint he expressed in his
comment was unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination.28
A. Color of State Law
The court held that Randall acted under “color of state law” in
maintaining her “Chair Phyllis J. Randall” Facebook page and in
actually banning Davison from the page.29 It is key that Randall acted
under color of state law because constitutional standards are only
invoked when it can be said that the government is responsible for the
conduct at issue.30 Davison’s claim that Randall violated his First
Amendment rights hinged on Randall’s conduct being fairly

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 706, 710.
Id. at 710–11.
Id. at 711.
Id.
Id. at 706.
Id. at 724.
Id.
Id. at 714.
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
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attributable to actions of the government rather than to Randall as a
private citizen.31
Citing Fourth Circuit precedent, the Davison court noted that
“state action occurs where ‘apparently private actions . . . have a
sufficiently close nexus with the State to be fairly treated as’ the
actions of ‘the State itself.’”32 Moreover, “[w]hat constitutes a
sufficient nexus is largely ‘a matter of normative judgment,’”33 and
there “is ‘no specific formula’ for making this determination.”34 The
Davison court finally noted that the totality of the circumstances
should be weighed in determining whether conduct is attributable to
the State.35 Thus, the Davison court assessed the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether Randall’s banning of Davison
was conduct fairly attributable to the State.36
The following factors weighed against a finding of state action:
Randall’s official duties not including operation of a social media
website, the page remaining under Randall’s control when she left
office, Randall never using county-issued electronic devices to post on
the page, and much of Randall’s social media activities taking place
outside her office and normal working hours.37
In contrast to the above points in Randall’s favor, the court
identified many more factors tending to show the page’s operation was
fairly attributable to the State. First, the impetus for Randall creating
the page “Chair Phyllis J. Randall” a day before taking office was her
victorious election.38 She had created the page specifically to address
her new constituents, as evidenced by her redirecting supporters to
visit this page from the one she had used while campaigning.39
Moreover, Randall had consistently employed the page as a “tool
of governance.”40 She had identified the page as a preferred means for
back and forth constituent conversations and, to that end, used it to
31. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 712.
32. Id. (quoting Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (some internal
quotation mark omitted)).
33. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 712 (quoting Rossignol, 316 F.3d at 523).
34. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 712 (quoting Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 292 (4th Cir.
2006)).
35. Id.; Rossignol, 316 F.3d at 523 n.1.
36. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 711–14.
37. Id. at 712.
38. Id. at 713.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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facilitate coordination of disaster relief efforts after a storm, and even
to aid a constituent’s daughter in her effort to study abroad.41 Randall
also used the page to promote participation in initiatives she headed,
invite attendance at events related to her work as Chair, and keep
constituents informed about her activities as Chair and of important
events in local government.42
The court also noted that Randall’s chief of staff, a salaried
employee of the county, helped operate the page.43 Randall’s use of
county resources to help manage “Chair Phyllis J. Randall” weighed
against finding that the page was private.44
Other factors weighing against the page being private included
Randall categorizing the page as “government official,” the title of the
page featuring Randall’s title as “Chair,” the page listing Randall’s
official county contact information, many of the posts being addressed
to Randall’s Loudoun County constituents, and the content posted
generally tending toward matters related to Randall’s office.45
The court concluded, based on the above, that the totality of the
circumstances indicated that Randall had operated the page while
“purporting to act under the authority vested in [her] by the state.”46
The court concluded so despite occasional posts on “Chair Phyllis J.
Randall” which detailed “personal” matters, such as an afternoon
shopping trip, due to the stronger countervailing tendency toward
posts that related to matters of Randall’s office.47 Moreover, the court
further noted that the actual act of banning Davison had official
implications as well because Randall had done so after taking offense
to Davison’s comment criticizing other government officials on the
county school board.48

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 714.
46. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hughes v. Halifax Cty. Sch. Bd., 855 F.2d 183, 186–
87 (4th Cir. 1988)).
47. Id. at 710, 714.
48. Id. at 714.
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B. Viewpoint-Based Discrimination
Having found that Randall acted under color of state law, the
court then concluded that Randall’s decision to ban Davison violated
his First Amendment rights.49
First, the court determined that Davison’s comment was protected
speech.50 Despite the exact wording being unavailable, the court used
the parties’ recollections of the comment to find that the comment
contained ethical questions about conflicts of interest involving school
board officials’ family members.51 The court noted that “such
‘criticism of . . . official conduct’ [was] not just protected speech, but”
also speech that lay at the very heart of the First Amendment.52
Next, the court found that Randall had opened a forum for speech
by creating the Facebook page.53 It backed this finding by referencing
Fourth Circuit jurisprudence holding that the government may open
fora for speech by creating websites “allow[ing] private persons to
publish information.”54 The court also noted a recent Supreme Court
decision likening social media platforms to traditional public fora
where speech is protected, such as parks and streets. 55 Even
discounting the above, the court pointed out that Randall herself
designated the page as a forum for speech by posting that she wanted
“to hear from ANY Loudoun citizen on ANY issues, request,
criticism, compliment, or just [his or her] thoughts.”56
The court concluded that Randall “committed a cardinal sin under
the First Amendment” by acting in her governmental capacity to delete
Davison’s post for no other reason than because it offended her.57 This
was despite the court’s admission that the consequences of Randall’s
actions were minor—Davison was only banned for a single night and
could have posted his message on multiple pages.58 Even so, the court
held that the First Amendment roundly prohibited government

49. Id. at 715–16.
50. Id. at 716.
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 428 (2006) (5-4 decision) (Souter, J., dissenting))).
53. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716.
54. Id. (quoting Page v. Lexington Cty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 284 (4th Cir. 2008)).
55. Id. (citing Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 717–18.
58. Id. at 718.
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suppression of “offensive” speech and applied with no less force in
social media than in other types of fora.59
The court closed the matter by clarifying that its ruling did not
foreclose public officials from moderating comments on their social
media.60 Rather, the conclusion reached here was based solely on a
public official engaging in viewpoint-based discrimination against a
private citizen within a forum for speech where the public official
eschewed the use of neutral, comprehensive social media policies like
Randall did with Loudoun County’s.61
IV. ANALYSIS
The proposition that public officials could violate the First
Amendment when they remove offensive commentary or commenters
from their social media account may seem to some like it came from
a district court overstepping its bounds. Indeed, some commentators
are either unsettled on Davison’s potential long-term worth62 or
outright dismissive of the ruling’s legal bases.63 The court’s finding is
nevertheless both legally solid and practically desirable.
A. Davison Is Built on Solid Legal Foundations
The Davison court found that Randall acted under color of state
law, thereby making her viewpoint-based discrimination against
Davison a violation of the First Amendment.64 Though novel in
dealing with the issue of when a government official’s actions through
his or her social media page is treated as governmental,65 the court’s
holding is reasonably derived from relevant precedent from both the
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Eugene Volokh, Some Help for Lawsuit Challenging Bans of Subscribers from
@RealDonaldTrump, WASH. POST (July 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/07/27/some-help-for-lawsuit-challenging-bans-of-subscribers-fromrealdonaldtrump/?utm_term=.b16529b309ff. But see Venkat Balasubramani, Politician Can’t Ban
Constituent from Her Official Facebook Page–Davison v. Loudoun County Supervisors, TECH. &
MARKETING L. BLOG (July 27, 2017), http://blog.eric goldman.org/archives/ 2017/07/politiciancant-ban-constituent-from-her-official-facebook-page-davison-v-loudoun-county-supervisors.htm
(opining that Davison “could turn into consequential precedent for constraints on the ability of
politicians . . . to block members of the public”).
63. See Thomas Wheatley, Why Social Media Is Not a Public Forum, WASH. POST (Aug. 4,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-opinions-are-local/wp/2017/08/04/why-socialmedia-is-not-a-public-forum/?utm_term=.18e76a291e4c.
64. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 723.
65. Volokh, supra note 62.
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Supreme Court and United States Courts of Appeals. Moreover, the
presumptive unconstitutionality of viewpoint-based discrimination by
a government official against a private citizen is well-settled law.66
1. Color of State Law
Victims of a First Amendment violation, like victims of any
constitutional violation, may pursue damages against a state actor who
infringes upon that right. Statutes like 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allow claims
by private citizens against public officials who act under color of state
law (as opposed to actual state action) to deprive private citizens of
their constitutional rights.67 The Supreme Court has stated “that in a
§1983 action brought against a state official, the statutory requirement
of action ‘under color of state law’ and the ‘state action’ requirement
of the Fourteenth Amendment are identical.”68 Of this identical
requirement for a finding of state action, the Supreme Court has held
that “[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the
nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed
its true significance.”69 Notably, conduct constituting “state action”
satisfies the § 1983 requirement for conduct under color of state law.70
From the above, the essential takeaway is that “state action” calls for
looking at the totality of the circumstances and “color of state law” is
satisfied if “state action” is found.
Indeed, Davison concluded as much, having noted that a totality
of the circumstances test used to find “state action” would also satisfy
the “color of state law” requirement.71 Thus, the Davison court’s
application of this test was proper.
The facts the Davison court considered under the totality of the
circumstances also comport with Supreme Court precedent. The
Supreme Court has stated that “[w]hat is fairly attributable [to the
state] is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid
simplicity. . . . [N]o one fact can function as a necessary condition
across the board.”72 Furthermore, “there may be some countervailing
66. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
68. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982).
69. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
70. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935.
71. Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 714 (E.D. Va. 2017),
aff’d sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019); Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d
516, 523 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003).
72. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001).
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reason against attributing activity to the government.”73 In Davison,
the factors that the court considered for finding a state action surely
met this loose “normative judgment” standard.74 The Davison court
also noted that no one fact was dispositive in making its decision, as
the above Supreme Court precedent directs.75 Lastly, the Davison
court did consider possible countervailing reasons against a finding of
state action, such as the fact that Randall did not use county-owned
electronics to post on social media.76 The court thus fairly applied
precedent in determining the factors used to find that Randall acted
under color of state law in her usage of “Chair Phyllis J. Randall.”77
2. Viewpoint-Based Discrimination
The Supreme Court has stated that “the right of free speech is not
absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”78 Thus, if the speech
at issue falls within one of the enumerated categories of unprotected
speech, there is no First Amendment violation.79 The speech at issue
in Davison was a Facebook comment raising ethical questions about
the Loudoun County School Board, which the court characterized as
speech critical of official conduct.80 Such “[o]pen speech by a private
citizen on a matter of public importance lies at the heart of expression
subject to protection by the First Amendment.”81 Thus, Davison’s
comment was speech protected by the First Amendment.82
Moreover, “[i]t is axiomatic that the government may not regulate
speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys.”83
Such viewpoint-based discrimination is presumptively impermissible
even in forums with otherwise valid restrictions on protected speech,
i.e., limited public forums.84 For this reason, Randall’s suppression of
73. Id. at 295–96.
74. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 712.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 714.
78. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
79. See id. at 571–72.
80. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 714.
81. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 428 (2006) (5-4 decision) (Souter, J., dissenting).
82. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 720.
83. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828, 830 (1995) (finding
that a public university’s exclusion of a student group’s religious newspaper from accessing the
“student activities fund” otherwise provided to secular groups was viewpoint-based discrimination
because the fund qualified as a “metaphysical” forum).
84. Id. at 829–30.
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Davison’s speech purely for its offensive content made determining
the type of forum unnecessary, so long as the comment section of the
“Chair Phyllis J. Randall” page was indeed a forum.85
On that forum issue, the Supreme Court has found that
metaphysical fora for speech are subject to the same protections as
spatial or geographic fora.86 It is likely that social media platforms like
Facebook, at least on pages created by government officials like
Randall, are such metaphysical fora where First Amendment
protections against viewpoint-based exclusion apply.87 Thus, the
Davison court correctly concluded that Randall engaged in viewpointbased discrimination against Davison.88
One critic of the Davison decision argued that because users agree
to the Facebook Terms of Service which “provides users the
unqualified ability to ‘avoid distasteful or offensive content’ by
unfriending, blocking and even reporting other users,” the courts
cannot alter or limit the site’s rules.89 However, First Amendment
protections for citizens against government censorship do not cease by
virtue of the interaction occurring on a privately-owned social media
platform; the same is true when a government agency rents a physical
space in a private building to hold a public meeting.90 Thus, the
Davison court’s finding rested on overall solid legal foundations.
B. The Davison Case Presents a Practical Guideline for Future
Cases Involving Social Media and the First Amendment
1. The Factors Found in Davison are Transferrable to Other Social
Media Cases
Many in the United States would be unsurprised to discover that
social media platforms are a prevalent aspect of the average person’s
life.91 Indeed, even the Supreme Court acknowledged that for many,
85. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716–17.
86. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
87. See Lidsky, supra note 10, at 1994–96; see also Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct.
1730, 1735 (2017) (likening “metaphysical” social media platforms such as Facebook to
quintessential spatial or geographic forums for speech like streets and parks).
88. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716.
89. Wheatley, supra note 63.
90. Eugene Volokh, More on the First Amendment and @RealDonaldTrump, WASH. POST
(June 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/14/moreon-the-first-amendment-and-realdonaldtrump/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.9d18c5c22742;
accord
Lidsky, supra note 10, at 1996.
91. Greenwood et al., supra note 9.
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social media platforms “are the principal sources for knowing current
events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the
modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of
human thought and knowledge.”92 Given this understanding of social
media’s importance and prevalence, it is crucial that the courts define
the limits of government officials’ use of such platforms.
Davison is therefore notable in providing a guideline for defining
these limits. As noted above, Davison is rooted in firm precedent.93
Moreover, in determining when a social media account maintained by
a public official is sufficiently governmental to be subject to
constitutional constraints, the court applied the proper “normative
judgment” standard to select the factors to weigh under the totality of
the circumstances.94 These factors included whether the official’s
duties involved maintenance of a social media website, whether the
account was used during the official’s work hours, the purpose for the
creation of the social media page, how the page was used, who the
intended audience was, whether government resources were involved,
the extent that the page referenced its creator’s office, and whether the
speech was suppressed for an “official” reason.95 Along with other
factors derived from a normative judgment of the facts, these
considerations could be directly applied to any case involving a
government official who used social media in an official capacity.
2. Davison Reasonably Advocates for Policies to Guide Discussion
and Avoid First Amendment Issues
As the Davison court notes, government officials can avoid
liability for moderating their pages by setting up comprehensive rules
to guide the discussion beforehand.96 Indeed, the court acknowledges
that “a degree of moderation is necessary to preserve social media
websites as useful forums for the exchange of ideas.”97 This may be
the court’s implicit admission of the “disinhibiting effect.”98 The
disinhibiting effect refers to the increased tendency of a speaker to
92. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
93. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
94. Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 712 (E.D. Va. 2017),
aff’d sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019).
95. See id. at 711–15.
96. See id. at 718, 721.
97. Id. at 718.
98. See Lidsky, supra note 10, at 2025.
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engage in profane and abusive speech whenever communication is
computer-mediated and the speaker believes he or she is anonymous.99
At first, it may seem incongruous with the overall holding of
Davison to suggest that government officials may simply restrict
speech so long as they set up discussion rules beforehand.100 However,
several circuits have found that certain reasonable or viewpointneutral restrictions against profane remarks in the context of city
council meetings were acceptable.101 The reason that such restrictions
on speech were allowed is that the unfiltered allowance of any remark
under any circumstance could make it difficult to accomplish the
business that those proceedings were scheduled for.102 For instance, a
governmental entity running a planning commission meeting is
allowed to limit discussion to specified agenda items and impose
restrictions against off-topic matters including personal attacks against
others.103 Given both the disinhibiting effect and the fact that
viewpoint-neutral rules are acceptable in such real-world spaces, there
is similarly good reason to encourage the adoption of such rules in a
social media context.104 Davison, which was based off the comparison
of social media platforms to a modern public forum,105 merely
expands upon the above reasoning.106 The Davison court even noted,
despite their overall verdict, that Randall remained free to adopt new
policies for the “Chair Phyllis J. Randall” page or disallow comments
altogether if she chose to do so.107
C. Application to Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump
The following is an illustration of how the factors considered in
Davison may apply to Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump and
future cases where there is a dispute over whether a social media
account is “governmental” enough, such that suppression of a private
citizen’s speech triggers a possible violation of the First Amendment.
99. Id.
100. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 718.
101. See Lidsky, supra note 10, at 2000–01.
102. Id.
103. See Steinburg v. Chesterfield Cty. Planning Comm’n, 527 F.3d 377, 384–85, 387 (4th Cir.
2008).
104. See Lidsky, supra note 10, at 2000–01.
105. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
106. See Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 718 (E.D. Va.
2017), aff’d sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019)
107. Id. at 723.
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This illustration also demonstrates that Davison’s instructional scope
is not simply limited to cases involving Facebook.108
1. Statement of the Case
This developing case is based around Twitter, a social media
platform used by 24% of online adults.109 Users of the service may
send out “tweets,” or posts, which are both relayed to users that have
“followed” that user and are otherwise displayed publicly.110 Users
may also send reply tweets to other users’ tweets, or even reply to the
replies of others; the collection of replies and replies-to-replies, which
appear under a base tweet, are sometimes called “comment
threads.”111 Lastly, users have the option of “blocking” other users,
thereby “restricting specific accounts from contacting them, seeing
their tweets, and following them.”112
The complaint identifies seven Twitter users, collectively referred
to as the “Individual Plaintiffs,” that were allegedly blocked from the
@realDonaldTrump account “because of opinions they expressed in
replies to the President’s tweets.”113 One example offered by the
complaint is the blocking of Plaintiff Brandon Neely for a tweet he
made to @realDonaldTrump on June 12, 2017.114 In response to
President Trump’s tweet congratulating the “First new Coal Mine of
Trump Era” opening in Pennsylvania, Neely tweeted: “Congrats and
now black lung won’t be covered under #TrumpCare.”115 Neely
discovered the next day that @realDonaldTrump had blocked him,
thus rendering him unable to contact, view, or otherwise interact with
President Trump’s tweets or associated comment threads.116 Plaintiff
argued that such viewpoint-based discrimination by Defendants was
108. The feasibility of the case concerning jurisdiction or issues of constitutional separation of
powers as raised by Defendants in their motion for summary judgment are not considered here. See
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, 8, Knight First
Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 17-cv05205) [hereinafter Motion for Summary Judgment].
109. Greenwood et al., supra note 9.
110. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 5, 8, 11.
111. Id. at 9; About Replies and Mentions, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/usingtwitter/mentions-and-replies (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
112. How to Block Accounts on Twitter, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/117063
(last visited Jan. 25, 2018).
113. Complaint, supra note 1, at 2.
114. Id. at 21.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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unconstitutional and that the Individual Plaintiffs were entitled to an
injunction preventing such conduct in the future.117
2. @realDonaldTrump Is Likely Governmental and Defendants
Likely Engaged in Unconstitutional Viewpoint-Based Exclusion
The complaint lays out its argument similarly to the reasoning of
the Davison court. First, the complaint identifies several factors
indicating that @realDonaldTrump is an official government account
rather than a private personal account.118 The complaint then
concludes that because the account was governmental, the
viewpoint-based suppression of the Individual Plaintiffs was
unconstitutional.119
a. @realDonaldTrump is likely sufficiently governmental
As noted above, the Davison court essentially conducted a “state
action” analysis that led to the conclusion that Randall acted under
color of state law in blocking Davison on Facebook.120 This decision
was the result of the court’s normative assessment of pertinent facts
tending to prove or disprove that the page was used in an official
capacity.121
Here, there are a few Davison factors weighing against a finding
of state action. First, the enumerated duties of the official in question
do not include the maintenance of a social media website.122 President
Trump also possessed the @realDonaldTrump account for eight years
prior to his inauguration,123 indicating that he will likely continue to
possess the account after he leaves office and that the account was not
set up in anticipation of his presidency.124 Additionally, while there
has been debate as to whether and to what extent President Trump used
a personal phone for tweeting or entrusted the task to his staff, it is
possible that the devices used are at least a mix of personal- and

117. Id. at 25.
118. See id. at 2.
119. Id. at 2–3.
120. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
121. Id.
122. See U.S. CONST. art. II; Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d
702, 712 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019); Motion
for Summary Judgment, supra note 108, at 12.
123. Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 108, at 2.
124. See id. at 12.
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government-owned.125 The use of a personal device, of course, would
tend to show private use.126 Finally, setting aside that the working
hours of a President are likely erratic, President Trump’s admission
that he tweets from bed confirms that he does not limit his Twitter use
to working hours.127
The factors above, weighing toward private use, roughly
correspond with those considered by the Davison court, but are not
exhaustive; the facts of individual cases are subject to “normative
judgment,” and other factors may be found weighing toward the
account being private.128 For example, a court might consider the
whole of @realDonaldTrump by comparing the eight years of tweets
prior to President Trump’s inauguration to after he took office and find
that this history as a non-governmental account strongly indicated that
the account was private.
However, many Davison factors support a finding of state action
here.129 First, Defendants “use the account to make formal
announcements, defend the President’s official actions, report on
meetings with foreign leaders, and promote the administration’s
positions on health care, immigration, foreign affairs, and other
matters.”130 This usage is reminiscent (albeit at a national scale) of the
ways Randall used her Facebook page; she also consistently addressed
her constituents and promoted certain policy initiatives as part of her
work in office.131 Notably, such tweets by @realDonaldTrump are
considered official enough that the National Archives and Records
Administration advised the White House that these tweets had to be
preserved under the Presidential Records Act.132 The Ninth Circuit,
with the understanding that the President’s tweets were official
statements of the President, even referenced one of these tweets in

125. See Kaveh Waddell, Is Trump Still Tweeting from His Unsecured Android Phone?,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/trumpandroid-tweets/520869/.
126. See Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 712 (E.D. Va.
2017), aff’d sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019).
127. See Nick Visser, Trump Finally Says It: He Tweets from Bed, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28,
2018,
9:49
PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-tweets-from-bed_us_
5a6e66aae4b0ddb658c78a0e.
128. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 712.
129. See id. at 714.
130. Complaint, supra note 1, at 2, 14.
131. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 713.
132. Complaint, supra note 1, at 15.
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striking down President Trump’s temporary travel-ban of nationals
from certain countries.133
Moreover, like Randall, President Trump and his staff used
government resources to manage the account.134 Members of
President Trump’s staff (then-White House Press Secretary Sean
Spicer and White House Social Media Director Daniel Scavino)
helped operate @realDonaldTrump; Daniel Scavino even
occasionally posted tweets on President Trump’s behalf.135
Additionally, like Randall’s “Chair Phyllis J. Randall” page, the
@realDonaldTrump page is swathed in references to the office: the
account is registered to the “45th President of the United States of
America, Washington, D.C.,” the header photograph sometimes
displays President Trump performing official duties like making
speeches, and many posts announce policies or decisions not yet made
on any other official channel.136 One post from @realDonaldTrump
even stated that “ My use of social media is not Presidential—it’s
MODERN DAY PRESIDENTIAL.”137
Lastly, the actual act of blocking the Individual Plaintiffs could
also be seen as indicative of state action. As with Randall’s
suppression of Davison for criticizing the conduct of government
officials, Defendants blocked the Individual Plaintiffs like Plaintiff
Neely following criticism they leveled toward the President.138
Weighing the totality of the circumstances, it is likely that a court
would find that @realDonaldTrump was an official, rather than
personal, account.
That being the case, it would be difficult for Defendants to argue
that there was no viewpoint-based exclusion of the Individual
Plaintiffs. As with Plaintiff Neely’s biting remark about President
Trump’s future healthcare policy,139 the Individual Plaintiffs were
133. Id. (citing Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 773 n.14 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, Trump v.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017)); see also Ali Vitali, Trump’s Tweets ‘Official Statements,’ Spicer
Says, NBC NEWS (June 6, 2017, 5:02 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trumps-tweets-official-statements-spicer-says-n768931 (noting former White House Press Secretary
Sean Spicer’s statement that “the president is president [sic] of the United States, so [the Tweets]
are considered official statements by the president of the United States”).
134. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 713; see Complaint, supra note 1, at 4–5.
135. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 4–5, 14–15.
136. See id. at 13–14.
137. Id. at 13.
138. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 714; see Complaint, supra note 1, at 2–3, 21.
139. Complaint, supra note 1, at 21.
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criticizing official conduct and therefore engaging in protected speech,
which is at the very heart of the First Amendment.140 Because
President Trump blocked the Individual Plaintiffs shortly after such
critical speech, thereby taking away their ability to engage with
@realDonaldTrump through their accounts, he discriminated on the
basis of the viewpoints expressed.141 Moreover, it is likely that the
comment threads associated with @realDonaldTrump’s posts are fora
for speech. Defendants consistently promoted @realDonaldTrump as
a channel for official communication and did not prevent access to the
tweets to anyone except the blocked Plaintiffs.142 If
@realDonaldTrump truly is an official account, as Davison indicates
it is, this viewpoint-based exclusion of the Individual Plaintiffs, in the
absence of any policies limiting the speech of commenters, violates
the First Amendment.143
V. CONCLUSION
The Davison case is very much a product of our times; social
media continues to grow ever more prevalent in the lives of many, and
heretofore unresolved (or unasked) questions, such as the First
Amendment concerns discussed above, will have to be addressed.
Even setting aside President Trump’s notable use of social media,
there remain government officials like Randall who interact with their
constituencies through such platforms. This is natural given the
efficiency and ease of interacting with one’s base in this way.
However, the question of whether and to what extent the Constitution
follows such officials to their social media accounts must therefore be
considered. For its part, Davison does this quite well. Reasonably
derived from existing precedent, the case provides a methodology with
relevant factors to consider in weighing whether a government
official’s social media use triggers a First Amendment issue. As such,
Davison offers an instructive blueprint for future cases dealing with
government officials’ suppression of private citizens’ speech on social
media.

140.
141.
142.
143.

See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 428 (2006) (5-4 decision) (Souter, J., dissenting).
Complaint, supra note 1, at 16.
Id. at 12–14.
Id. at 16.

